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I. Introduction
Consider the recent tragedy in Flint, Michigan, resulting
from a contaminated water supply. 1 After Flint switched from
Detroit’s water supply to water from the Flint River, its water
became tainted with high levels of lead, trihalomethanes, and
copper—some exceeding the limits in federal regulations. 2 Flint is
a poor city with a majority black population. 3 Indeed, financial
need drove the decision to switch water supplies in the first
place. 4 Instead of saving Flint money, this choice may now prove
1. See Yanan Wang, In Flint, Mich., There’s So Much Lead in Children’s
Blood that a State of Emergency Is Declared, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/12/15/toxic-watersoaring-lead-levels-in-childrens-blood-create-state-of-emergency-in-flint-mich/
(last visited Feb. 4, 2016) (reporting on the water contamination and lead
poisoning affecting Flint) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See id. (discussing the levels of contaminants in Flint’s water); see also
Ron Fonger, City Warns of Potential Health Risks After Flint Water Tests
Revealed Too Much Disinfection Byproduct, M LIVE (last updated Jan. 17, 2015,
10:04 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/flint_water_has_
high_disinfect.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2016) (“[T]he state Department of
Environmental Quality issued a notice of violation of the Safe Drinking Water
Act for maximum contaminant levels for trihalomethanes—or TTHM—a group
of four chemicals that are formed as a byproduct of disinfecting water.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See John Eligon, A Question of Environmental Racism in Flint, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/us/a-question-ofenvironmental-racism-in-flint.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 4, 2016) (“But it is
indisputable that in Flint, the majority of residents are black and many are
poor. . . . For civil rights advocates, the health crisis in Flint smacks of what has
become known as environmental racism.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
4. See Kemi Fuentes-George, Flint’s Structural Racism: This Is Why
Providing Poisoned Water to the City’s Citizens Seemed Like a Reasonable Idea,
SALON (Feb. 7, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/02/07/flints_structural_
racism_this_is_why_providing_poisoned_water_to_the_citys_citizens_seemed_
like_a_reasonable_idea/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2016) (“In an effort to cut corners,
the state had ‘no choice’ but to abandon any renovations of the dilapidated water
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far more costly to both the city and the state of Michigan. 5 More
importantly, it burdens the population with lead levels that are
almost twice as high as they were before the switch, among other
devastating impacts. 6
Lead exposure causes irreversible damage, including
behavioral change and neurological impacts, immunotoxicity, and
“toxicity to the reproductive organs.” 7 These harms are especially
acute for children exposed to lead—like the children in Flint. 8
Recent scientific research shows that the children in Flint will
face not only physical symptoms, but also changes to how their
genetic code operates. 9 Lead exposure causes changes in gene
expression that “may not only have immediate dire consequences
for brain development, but may also have effects that persist
after the initial exposure.” 10 Flint’s population now suffers from
changes in gene expression predisposing them to neurological
infrastructure, and use the cheapest source of water available, despite
persistent questions about its suitability.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
5. Estimates of the cost of cleaning the Flint water crisis have ranged
from $60 million to $300 billion. See, e.g., Matthew Dolan, Flint Water Crisis
Could Cost U.S. $300 Billion, USA TODAY (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2016/03/05/flint-water-crisis-could-costus-300-billion/81359834/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (discussing the costs of
replacing water infrastructure and compensating injured plaintiffs) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Nick Stockton, Here’s How Hard It Will
(Jan.
29,
2016),
Be
to
Unpoison
Flint’s
Water,
WIRED
http://www.wired.com/2016/01/heres-how-hard-it-will-be-to-unpoison-flints-water/
(last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (estimating the cost of replacing Flint’s lead pipes to
be $60 million over fifteen years) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
6. See Wang, supra note 1 (“The proportion of infants and children with
above-average levels of lead in their blood has nearly doubled since the city
switched from the Detroit water system to using the Flint River as its water
source, in 2014.”).
7. Lead Poisoning and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 2015),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs379/en/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2016)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. Id.
9. See Marie-Claude Senut et al., Epigenetics of Early-Life Lead Exposure
and Effects on Brain Development, 4 EPIGENOMICS 665, 668–69 (2012)
(discussing how early-life lead exposure changes gene expression, causing not
only immediate impacts but also leading to late-onset neurological diseases like
Alzheimer’s).
10. Id. at 669.
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diseases like Alzheimer’s. 11 Sadly, the children exposed to lead in
Flint may even pass this predisposition for disease to their
grandchildren and great-grandchildren. 12
To obtain compensation for these harms through the legal
system, an exposed child in Flint—or her descendants—would
face the obstacle of proving the causal chain between exposure
and disease onset. 13 Toxic tort cases create unique challenges for
the traditional tort causation model. 14 Plaintiffs often must prove
factual cause in tort through “but-for” causation. 15 Yet in toxic
tort cases, courts typically go beyond this standard to require
proof of both general and specific causation. 16 General causation
considers “whether the substance at issue had the capacity to
cause the harm alleged.” 17 Plaintiffs must prove general
causation as a threshold matter. 18 Such proof typically relies on
11. Id. at 669–70.
12. See id. at 670 (“[S]ome changes in epigenetic determinants can extend
to the germline, raising the possibility that [lead]-induced alterations could be
propagated transgenerationally.”); see also Arko Sen et al., Multigenerational
Epigenetic Inheritance in Humans: DNA Methylation Changes Associated with
Maternal Exposure to Lead Can Be Transmitted to the Grandchildren, 5 SCI.
REP. 1, 6 (2015) (concluding that lead exposure in a pregnant woman can change
the gene expression patterns of her grandchildren); infra Part II.B (discussing
the heritability of epigenetic harms).
13. See infra Part IV (summarizing how courts handle the causation issue
in toxic tort cases).
14. See Steve C. Gold, When Certainty Dissolves into Probability: A Legal
Vision of Toxic Causation for the Post-Genomic Era, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237,
244 (2013) (“A fundamental difficulty in proving such a claim is that exposure
and disease usually do not correlate perfectly: some people get sick without
exposure, and some people receive exposure without getting sick.”).
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. AND EMOT. HARM
§ 26 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“[A]n act is a factual cause of an outcome if, in
the absence of the act, the outcome would not have occurred.”).
16. See Henricksen v. Conoco Phillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1155 (E.D.
Wash. 2009) (“Courts in toxic tort cases often separate the causation inquiry
into general causation and specific causation.”); see also Loren Peck, How Sound
Is the Science? Applying Daubert to Biomechanical Experts’ Injury Causation
Opinions, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063, 1083–86 (2016) (elaborating on the
difference between general and specific causation and applying Daubert to
evidence in personal injury cases).
17. Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. v. E. I. Dupont, 292 F.3d 1124,
1133 (9th Cir. 2002).
18. See Gold, supra note 14, at 245 (“Courts initially demand proof of
‘general causation,’ asking whether the exposure in question is ever a sine qua
non for the plaintiff’s disease, or whether the existence of cases of disease after
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epidemiological data at the population level rather than data
specific to an individual plaintiff’s injury. 19 Epidemiological data
results from population-level studies that determine the
connection, if any, between diseases and environmental
exposures or conditions. 20
In contrast, specific causation “refers to whether a particular
individual suffers from a particular ailment as a result of
exposure to a substance.” 21 Once plaintiffs prove general
causation, they must also prove their individual exposure to the
substance and the causal chain leading to their resulting injury. 22
Toxic tort cases often fail to prove specific causation because the
biological mechanisms of exposure and disease are unknown or
uncertain. 23
Epigenetics—an emerging scientific field—provides a new
causal mechanism for connecting disease to environmental toxin
exposures. 24 Epigenetics refers to the study of “heritable changes
exposure is merely coincidental.”).
19. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 715–17 (Tex.
1997) (summarizing the different standards that courts use to determine
causation based on epidemiological evidence).
20. Id. at 715 (“Epidemiological studies examine existing populations to
attempt to determine if there is an association between a disease or condition
and a factor suspected of causing that disease or condition.”).
21. Hanford, 292 F.3d at 1133.
22. See Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1999) (“It is
well established that a plaintiff in a toxic tort case must prove that he or she
was exposed to and injured by a harmful substance manufactured by the
defendant.”); Wright v. Willamette Indus., 91 F.3d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir. 1996)
(“[A] plaintiff in a toxic tort case must prove . . . the plaintiff’s actual level of
exposure to the defendant’s toxic substance before he or she may recover.”);
Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Scientific knowledge
of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical, plus knowledge that the plaintiff
was exposed to such quantities, are minimal facts necessary to sustain the
plaintiffs’ burden in a toxic tort case.”).
23. See June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1245 (10th Cir. 2009)
(noting that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence that exposure to radiation
“was either a but-for cause of any medical condition . . . or . . . a necessary
component of a causal set that would probably have caused one of those
conditions”); see also Gold, supra note 14, at 250–52 (discussing the nearly
“impossible task” of proving but-for causation in toxic tort cases).
24. See Laura S. Rozek et al., Epigenetics: Relevance and Implications for
Public Health, 35 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 105, 107 (2014) (“Molecular
epidemiology is a useful approach for linking exposures and disease in human
populations.”).
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in gene expression that are not due to any alteration in the DNA
sequence.” 25 A variety of chemicals and environmental conditions
cause adverse health effects through epigenetic mechanisms. 26
These changes therefore provide an intermediate causal link
between exposure (and risk creation) and the onset of disease. 27
Epigenetics provides an opportunity for courts to reframe the
causation issue for toxic torts, particularly when considering
liability for increased risk of disease. 28 This Note argues for
courts to accept epigenetic harm as present physical injury for an
increased risk claim and recommends that courts submit
epidemiological evidence to the fact-finders without arbitrary
legal cutoffs for scientific rigor.
Part II of this Note provides a scientific background and
summarizes the current state of epigenetics research. Part III
summarizes the primary challenges of proving causation in toxic
tort cases and how courts address these challenges by modifying
the existing causation framework. Part IV discusses how
epigenetics can inform the causation inquiry in toxic torts cases
and argues for modifying the increased risk framework according
to scientific development.
II. Scientific Background
A. Gene Expression and the Epigenome
“Gene expression” refers to the process of producing proteins
from the underlying DNA sequence—which is also known as the
genetic code or genome. 29 Epigenetics describes the regulation of
25. Manel Esteller, Molecular Origins of Cancer: Epigenetics in Cancer, 358
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1148, 1148 (2008).
26. See Andrea Baccarelli & Valentina Bollati, Epigenetics and
Environmental Chemicals, 21 CURRENT OP. PEDIATRICS 243, 244–49 (2009)
(summarizing the epigenetic impacts of various environmental chemicals).
27. See Rozek, supra note 24, at 108 (describing how epigenetics can be
used to “identify relevant markers for translational studies of disease prediction
and treatment in human populations”).
28. See Gold, supra note 14, at 299–302 (discussing how courts might
reframe increased risk and causation as science reveals the cellular changes
leading to disease symptoms).
29. See E.R. Gibney & C.M. Nolan, Epigenetics and Gene Expression, 105
HEREDITY 4, 4–5 (2010) (providing an overview of the steps involved in gene
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this process. 30 Genes can be activated or silenced—turned “on” or
“off”—meaning they do or do not produce protein. 31 Genes can
also be up-regulated or down-regulated, meaning they generate
more or less of their protein product. 32 These changes in gene
expression can have positive, negative, or neutral effects on
health. 33 For example, epigenetic changes can serve a protective
function by allowing an organism to adapt quickly to
environmental cues. 34 They can silence genes that are likely to
cause disease. 35 Epigenetic change can, however, also lead to
serious diseases—when silencing genes with a protective
function, for example. 36
Many different biological and chemical pathways regulate
gene expression. 37 Although the underlying molecular DNA
expression).
30. See David Rodenhiser & Mellissa Mann, Epigenetics and Human
Disease: Translating Basic Biology into Clinical Applications, 174 CAN. MED.
ASS’N J. 341, 341 (2006) (“[Epigenetics] is the study of heritable changes in gene
function that do not change the DNA sequence but, rather, provide an ‘extra’
layer of transcriptional control that regulates how genes are expressed.”).
31. See id. (“Changes to the structure of chromatin influence gene
expression: genes are inactivated (switched off) when the chromatin is
condensed (silent), and they are expressed (switched on) when chromatin is open
(active).”).
32. See Gerda Egger et al., Epigenetics in Human Disease and Prospects
for Epigenetic Therapy, 429 NATURE 457, 460–61 (2004) (describing the upregulation and down-regulation of different genes associated with cancers);
Mark A. Rothstein et al., The Ghost in Our Genes: Legal and Ethical
Implications of Epigenetics, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 5 (2009) (“While epigenetic
changes can result in changes in the expression of . . . traits, they do so not by
changing the form or function of gene products, but by altering the timing and
quantity of their production in tissues at key points in time.”).
33. See Rothstein et al., supra note 32, at 7–21 (providing an overview of
normal and abnormal epigenetic changes in cells).
34. See id. at 10 (“Such mechanisms allow a developing organism to adjust
its phenotype to its anticipated environment, thereby increasing its
fitness . . . .”).
35. See id. at 8 (noting that a normal role of the epigenome is to silence
“disruptive sequences” that are likely to mutate and cause cancer or other
diseases).
36. See Randy L. Jirtle & Michael K. Skinner, Environmental Epigenomics
and Disease Susceptibility, 8 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 253, 257 (2007) (describing
how a single epigenetic change can silence a protective tumor-suppressor gene
and result in higher cancer risk).
37. See Edith Heard & Robert A. Martienssen, Transgenerational
Epigenetic Inheritance: Myths and Mechanisms, 157 CELL 95, 99 (2005)
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sequence—As, Ts, Cs, and Gs 38—remains the same, epigenetic
changes shape an organism’s traits, health, and development. 39
The more common epigenetic modifications involve chemical
changes to the DNA sequence that tighten or loosen the DNA
structure (known as chromatin) itself. 40 These structural changes
affect the ease of creating protein product from the gene
sequence. 41 With a more compact structure, the biological
machinery needed to create proteins has more difficulty attaching
to the DNA, creating less or no protein product. 42 A more open
structure, however, allows for easier binding and “reading” of the
DNA sequence, leading to more protein product. 43 The
illustration below shows some different structures of DNA. 44

(summarizing a variety of epigenetic mechanisms).
38. These letters refer to the nucleotide building blocks of DNA that pair to
create the double-helix structure: adenine, thymine, cytosine, and guanine. See
generally Leslie A. Pray, Discovery of DNA Structure and Function: Watson and
EDUC.
100
(2008),
Crick,
1
NATURE
http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/discovery-of-dna-structure-andfunction-watson-397.
39. See Rothstein et al., supra note 32, at 5 (“Changes in determining
which genes are expressed and their degree of expression can have dramatic
effects on the development and characteristics of an organism.”).
40. See Rodenhiser, supra note 30, at 341 (discussing the basic chemical
modifications to DNA structure and their impacts on gene expression).
41. See id. (describing how the epigenome guides the process of creating
protein from genes).
42. See id. (discussing the impacts of condensed chromatin on gene
expression).
43. See id. (discussing the impacts of open chromatin on gene expression).
44. Figure reprinted from Rodenhiser, supra note 30, at 342.
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Figure 1
Open chromatin
structure, allowing for
more transcription and
protein product.
Condensed chromatin
structure, slowing
transcription and
impeding the creation
of protein.

The “epigenome” refers to all of the epigenetic changes in an
organism. 45 Such changes explain why organisms with identical
DNA sequences can exhibit different physical characteristics and
“different susceptibilities to a disease.” 46 The underlying gene
sequence is analogous “to the hardware of a computer, whereas
epigenetic information has been compared to computer software
that controls the operation of the hardware.” 47
Epigenetic changes occur normally in cells. 48 Their most
important role, for example, is controlling cell differentiation. 49
Although every cell in the human body has the same underlying

45. See Rothstein et al., supra note 39, at 6 (“Each epigenetic change is
referred to as a ‘mark,’ and the total set of epigenetic marks in an organism is
referred to as the epigenome.”).
46. Esteller, supra note 25, at 1148.
47. Rothstein et al., supra note 39, at 3.
48. See id. at 7–11 (discussing the role of epigenetic programming in cells
through normal development); see also Esteller, supra note 25, at 1148 (“DNA
methylation has critical roles in the control of gene activity and the architecture
of the nucleus of the cell.”).
49. See Rothstein et al., supra note 39, at 7 (“The primary function of
epigenetic programming is to control cell differentiation through differential
gene expression.”).
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DNA sequence, different cells serve very different purposes
through differential gene expression. 50
From an evolutionary perspective, the epigenome also allows
quick adaptation to environmental cues. 51 For example, rat pups
with mothers who failed to nurse properly show an increased
stress response later in life. 52 These mothers’ nursing failures
likely resulted from some environmental threat, and the pups
face the same environment. 53 The rat pups inherited some
epigenetic markers from their mother, and their mother’s
behavior further shaped their epigenomes. 54 These epigenetic
changes create nervous offspring, who will be better prepared to
react to environmental threats and should survive longer. 55
However, disease and other problems arise when epigenetic
changes fail to match environmental stressors—usually as a
result of mixed environmental cues or epigenetic modifications
inherited from parents. 56 The rat pups, for example, may face a
50. See id. at 7–8 (“Yet, different cell types, whether skin cells, muscle
cells, bone cells, or nerve cells, display markedly different properties due to
different sets of genes being turned on or off.”).
51. See Graham C. Burdge & Karen A. Lillycrop, Nutrition, Epigenetics,
and Developmental Plasticity: Implications for Understanding Human Disease,
30 ANN. REV. NUTRITION 315, 330–31 (2010) (discussing examples where
epigenetic changes from environmental cues enhance organism fitness);
Rothstein et al., supra note 39, at 9 (“[E]pigenetics provides a mechanism for a
developing organism, either in utero or post-natally, to assess its environment
and adjust its genetic response accordingly.”).
52. See Burdge & Lillycrop, supra note 51, at 330 (summarizing epigenetic
changes that likely increase evolutionary fitness).
53. See Ian C.G. Weaver et al., Epigenetic Programming by Maternal
Behavior, 7 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 847, 852 (2004) (“Such effects commonly
follow from the exposure of the mother to the same or similar forms of threat
and may represent examples whereby the experience of the mother is translated
through an epigenetic mechanism of inheritance into phenotypic variation in the
offspring.”).
54. See, e.g., I. Mendizabal et al., Epigenetics and Evolution, 54
INTEGRATIVE & COMP. BIOLOGY 31, 31 (2014) (noting that epigenetic changes
include those that arise from environmental cues during an organism’s lifespan
and those transmitted through generations).
55. See Burdge & Lillycrop, supra note 51, at 330 (“More nervous offspring
may be less susceptible to being stalked by predators.”).
56. See id. at 317 (“[A]n incorrect prediction, such as may occur if maternal
nutrition is adequate but placental function is suboptimal, would result in
mismatch between the physiology of the offspring and the future environment.
Such mismatch has been suggested to underlie cardio-metabolic disease in
humans.”).
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different environment than their mother did—one where an
overactive stress response becomes burdensome rather than
advantageous.
B. Heritability of Epigenetic Change
Epigenetic changes have been shown to persist over many
generations of offspring. 57 Unlike the underlying DNA sequence,
a mammal’s epigenome is subject to “reprogramming” or
“resetting” in the embryo stage. 58 Most of the epigenetic marks
are erased and reset early in development. 59 However, not all of
the epigenetic changes are subject to this process, meaning that
some are passed through generations. 60 The epigenome can have
both
transgenerational
and
intergenerational
effects. 61
Intergenerational effects describe those passed along to
organisms that were exposed to an environmental factor in
utero—a mother and child have the same epigenetic change. 62
Transgenerational effects, however, describe those that persist
beyond generations exposed to the environmental factor—an
organism and its great-grandparent have the same epigenetic
change. 63 Some epigenetic modifications have persisted for
hundreds of years in plant species and for over forty generations
in some animals. 64 Studies have shown epigenetic changes from
toxin exposure persisting for up to four generations. 65 Most
57. See Heard & Martienssen, supra note 37, at 95 (summarizing studies
showing intergenerational and transgenerational effects of epigenetic change).
58. Mendizabal et al., supra note 54, at 37.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., id. (discussing studies of plants and animals which revealing
that “some epigenetic marks escape epigenetic reprogramming”).
61. See Heard & Martienssen, supra note 37, at 96 (“[I]t is important to
distinguish [intergenerational] effects, such as the impact of in utero exposure
to particular . . . environments . . . from truly transgenerational effects that are
found in generations that were not exposed to the initial signal or environment
that triggered the change.”).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 103 (discussing examples of transgenerational effects in
different types of organisms).
65. See Matthew D. Anway et al., Epigenetic Transgenerational Actions of
Endocrine Disruptors and Male Fertility, 308 SCI. 1466, 1466 (2005) (noting that
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human studies have focused on intergenerational impacts, and
further research is needed on both transgenerational and
intergenerational effects. 66 Even so, research firmly establishes
the impact of environmental cues on individuals throughout all
stages of development. 67 Because the science on intergenerational
harms is still developing, this Note addresses epigenetic harms in
only the generation exposed to a toxin. 68
C. Epigenetics and Disease
A variety of chemicals and environmental conditions cause
epigenetic changes that lead to adverse health effects. 69 Some
toxins linked to specific epigenetic changes include: lead, arsenic,
cadmium, nickel, chromium, methylmercury, air pollutants,
benzene, BPA, trichloroethylene, arsenic, and persistent organic
pollutants. 70 The study of epigenetics reveals a number of
biological mechanisms connecting exposure to substances like
these with disease symptoms. 71 For example, many different
endocrine disruptors caused “transgenerational defects in spermatogenic
capacity and sperm viability”); Mohan Manikkam et al., Transgenerational
Actions of Environmental Compounds on Reproductive Disease and
Identification of Epigenetic Biomarkers of Ancestral Exposures, PLOS ONE, Feb.
2012, at 5 (“[T]he current study has established the transgenerational actions of
these compounds . . . .”).
66. See Heard & Martienssen, supra note 37, at 105 (discussing the
evidence for intergenerational and transgenerational effects in human
populations).
67. See id. (“[D]ifferent nutritional cues during infancy and childhood can
have adverse effects during adult life, and exposure to pollutants, alcohol, and
tobacco can affect fetal programming. . . . [A] wide range of environmental
conditions during embryonic development and early life determine susceptibility
to disease during adult life.”).
68. See infra Part V (discussing how epigenetic evidence can be used to
prove causation in cases where a plaintiff is exposed to a toxin).
69. See Baccarelli & Bollati, supra note 26, at 244–49 (summarizing the
epigenetic impacts of various substances, including heavy metals, air pollution,
endocrine disruptors, and other environmental contaminants).
70. See, e.g., id. at 247 (providing a table of the epigenetic effects of various
environmental chemicals).
71. See id. at 249 (“Epigenetics holds substantial potential for developing
biological markers to predict which exposures would put exposed individuals at
risk and which individuals will be more susceptible to develop disease.”).
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cancer tumors show abnormal epigenetic marks. 72 Certain
epigenetic changes can even be used to predict cancer patient
outcomes and responses to treatment. 73 The table below provides
a summary of some human diseases that have been linked to
epigenetic abnormalities, with the “biological process” column
indicating the type of epigenetic change that was found. 74

72. See Esteller, supra note 25, at 1152 (listing “epigenetic aberrations”
across thirteen types of cancers in Table 1).
73. See id. at 1155 (noting that certain epigenetic marks “can be indicators
of the prognosis in patients with cancer” and act as “a predictor of the response
to treatment”); Dieter Weichenhan & Christoph Plass, The Evolving Epigenome,
22 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS R1, R2 (2013) (“Cancer-specific DNA methylation
can serve as a marker for early detection of a disease or as a prognostic marker
that helps to classify tumor subgroups with different biological or clinical
features.”).
74. Table reprinted from Rodenhiser & Mann, supra note 30, at 344.
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Table 1: Associations Between Epigenetic Modifications and
Human Diseases and Conditions

This table summarizes just a few of the scientific studies
linking epigenetic changes to disease. 75 Epigenetics therefore
provides a scientific link between exposure to toxic chemicals and

75. See Arline T. Geronimus, Deep Integration: Letting the Epigenome Out
of the Bottle Without Losing Sight of the Structural Origins of Population
Health, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S56, S56 (2013) (discussing the relationships
between epigenetic changes and population health).
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disease onset. 76 The interplay between the genome and the
epigenome provides another layer of complication, as certain
genes may even create a propensity for abnormal epigenetic
changes. 77 Scientific research, however, will continue to link
toxins to epigenetic markers, and epigenetic markers to certain
diseases. The legal issue, then, becomes how to consider these
markers in the causation analysis.
III. Using Scientific Evidence to Prove Causation
A. Overview of Causation
Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases face great difficulty proving
specific causation. 78 Most courts follow the but-for test for
causation in tort cases: “Conduct is a factual cause of harm when
the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.” 79 This
test fits poorly with the factual progression of the typical toxic
tort case—exposure, followed by a long latency period, only some
of the exposed falling ill, and many possible contributing causes. 80
Environmentally caused diseases do not follow a simple but-for
model of causation. 81 As a result, courts and scholars have
suggested alternative tests for evaluating causation in toxic tort
cases. 82
76. See Baccarelli & Bollati, supra note 26, at 244–49 (noting chemicals
that have been linked to epigenetic change and disease).
77. See Rodenhiser & Mann, supra note 30, at 343 (“People’s sensitivity to
diet or to environmental toxins may vary owing to pre-existing genetic variants
that can challenge methyl metabolism and predispose a person to epigenetic
change.”).
78. See Gold, supra note 14, at 245–52 (discussing obstacles to proving
causation in toxic injury cases).
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (2014).
80. See Gold, supra note 14, at 244 (“[E]xposure and disease usually do not
correlate perfectly: some people get sick without exposure, and some people
receive exposure without getting sick. In marked contrast to traumatic injury
cases, the disease process itself is unobserved and unobservable as it occurs, and
inscrutable afterward.”).
81. See, e.g., Fazal Khan, Preserving Human Potential as Freedom: A
Framework for Regulating Epigenetic Harms, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 259, 283
(2010) (“From a biological perspective, the concept of disease as a spectrum
rather than a binary on/off event is logical.”).
82. See infra Part IV (summarizing how courts have modified causation
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Most tort cases require plaintiffs to prove causation by the
preponderance of the evidence, meaning that plaintiffs must
show a degree of certainty over fifty percent for the fact-finder to
find for the plaintiff. 83 Different courts follow different
approaches to reaching this proof threshold for the causation
issue. Some states require evidence of both general and specific
causation—sometimes referred to as a “strong” view of
causation. 84 A minority of states allow a plaintiff to prove
causation based solely on evidence of general causation—
sometimes referred to as a “weak” view of causation. 85 How a
court considers population-level data (as opposed to
plaintiff-specific data) becomes a key difference between these
approaches.
B. The Role of Epidemiological Studies and Scientific Parameters
Most scientific evidence in toxic tort cases involves
epidemiological studies, which examine the relationship between
environmental factors and disease. 86 Different states demand
different standards for allowing epidemiological data to prove
general or specific causation. 87 As with any evidence,
epidemiological studies face the threshold legal issues of
admissibility and sufficiency. 88 Admissibility refers to whether or
doctrine to fit toxic tort cases).
83. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:
A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 857–58 (1984)
(discussing how different courts approach proof of causation in toxic tort cases).
84. See In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1261
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that a plaintiff must “offer both epidemiologic evidence
that the probability of causation exceeds fifty percent in the exposed population
and ‘particularistic’ proof that the conduct complained of caused him harm
individually”).
85. See Rosenberg, supra note 83, at 857–58 (noting that a “weak version”
of causation “authorizes verdicts founded solely on statistical evidence”).
86. See Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d
584, 590–91 (D.N.J. 2002) (“Epidemiological studies attempt to identify agents
that are associated with an increased risk of disease.”).
87. See infra Part IV (addressing the different approaches that courts use
in considering epidemiological evidence).
88. See Michael D. Green, D. Michal Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference
Guide on Epidemiology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 549, 610 (3d ed. 2011) (“Two legal issues arise with regard
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not a court should consider the study as evidence, while
sufficiency refers to how much weight a court gives a study when
considering the plaintiff’s case. 89
Scientific evidence usually meets the admissibility standard
more easily than it meets the sufficiency standard. 90 The
admissibility of expert evidence in federal courts is governed by
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the cases of Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 91 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 92
and General Electric Co. v. Joiner 93. 94 Within these boundaries,
though, some scholars and courts require only a low bar for
admissibility: “An epidemiologic study that is sufficiently rigorous
to justify a conclusion that it is scientifically valid should be
admissible, as it tends to make an issue in dispute more or less
likely.” 95 Generally, plaintiffs do not face strict bars to the
admissibility of epidemiological data.
Courts become stricter when dealing with the issue of
sufficiency of evidence, often following bright-line cutoffs
according to certain scientific parameters, such as relative risk or
dose-response curves. 96 Relative risk represents the increased
to the role of epidemiology in proving individual causation: admissibility and
sufficiency of evidence to meet the burden of production.”).
89. Id. at 610–11.
90. See, e.g., id. (“[Admissibility] tends to receive less attention by the
courts but nevertheless deserves mention.”); Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., No. 08C-07-106 FSS, 2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 209, at *14 (Del.
Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2012) (“Some jurisdictions follow [a bright-line rule for
admissibility]. Others accept the statistical significance requirements as a
measure of evidentiary sufficiency, but not as a threshold for admissibility. And,
others merely require a positive association, relying on the jury to determine the
significance of the studies after proper instruction.”); Ellis v. Int’l Playtex, Inc.,
745 F.2d 292, 303 (4th Cir. 1984) (“Playtex’s concern about the methodology of
the studies should have been addressed to the relative weight accorded the
evidence and not its admissibility.”).
91. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
92. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
93. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
94. A thorough discussion on the admissibility of scientific evidence under
these rules and precedents is beyond the scope of this Note. For an overview of
these issues, see 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FED. PRAC. &
PROC. § 6266 (Supp. 2012). See also Peck, supra note 16, at 1072–76
(summarizing the Daubert standard).
95. Green, supra note 88, at 610.
96. See id. at 612 (discussing how courts handle evidence related to relative
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risk of disease faced by people exposed to a certain substance. 97 A
dose-response curve represents how this risk changes with
increasing exposure. 98 Texas, for example, requires a relative risk
of 2.0 or greater before allowing epidemiological data to satisfy
even general causation. 99 The relevance of these two parameters
for toxic tort cases is explained further below.
1. Relative Risk
Epidemiological data typically yields a factor known as
“relative risk” 100:
Relative risk indicates the difference in risk of contracting a
disease in people exposed to a risk factor, as compared to those
not exposed (but otherwise similar). Determining the relative
risk is important in understanding the results of a study
because virtually every disease associated with a risk factor
also occurs, at some rate, in the general population not
exposed to the risk factor. 101

To calculate a relative risk factor, scientists divide the risk of
developing a disease in a group exposed to an environmental
factor by the risk of developing a disease in a similar group that
is not exposed. 102 For example, if 9 out of 100 people develop a
disease while taking a particular drug, but 6 out of 100 people not
on the drug also develop the disease, the relative risk would be

risk of disease).
97. Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584,
591 (D.N.J. 2002).
98. McClain v. Metabolite Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir. 2005).
99. See Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Tex. 2011) (“[W]hen
parties attempt to prove general causation using epidemiological evidence, a
threshold requirement of reliability is that the evidence demonstrate a
statistically significant doubling of the risk.”).
100. See Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 374
(Vt. 2010) (noting that epidemiological data quantifies “the degree of association
between a given substance and a disease by assigning a ‘relative risk’ factor to
the association”).
101. Magistrini, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
102. See id. (noting that relative risk factors are “calculated by dividing the
risk of developing a disease observed in an exposed group by the risk observed
in an unexposed, but otherwise similar group”).
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.09/.06 = 1.5. 103 If both groups show the same occurrence of
disease, then the risks are identical, the relative risk is 1.0, and
the factor does not correlate with a higher incidence of disease. 104
A relative risk of 2.0, known as “doubling of the risk,” means that
the group exposed to a toxin showed twice as many individuals
with disease as the unexposed group. 105 Therefore, courts have
determined that a relative risk over 2.0 supports the assertion
that a “plaintiff’s disease was more likely than not caused by the
implicated agent.” 106 Accordingly, a number of courts require a
relative risk of 2.0 or greater for a plaintiff to satisfy the burden
of proof on general causation. 107 Courts that allow epidemiological
data to satisfy specific causation—the “weak” view—may also
require plaintiffs to meet a relative risk cutoff of 2.0. 108 The Third
Restatement of Torts follows this model, requiring a relative risk
of over 2.0 before an epidemiological study may be submitted to
the jury for specific causation. 109
103. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 717
(Tex. 1997) (providing a sample calculation for relative risk).
104. See Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d
584, 591 (D.N.J. 2002) (“If the risks of the unexposed and exposed are the same,
then the relative risk estimate (which mathematically is simply the former
divided by the latter) is 1.0. This . . . indicates that exposure is not associated
with the disease in that study.”).
105. Green et al., supra note 88, at 612.
106. Id.
107. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 717 (“[W]e are persuaded . . . that there is a
rational basis for relating the requirement that there be more than a ‘doubling
of the risk’ to our no evidence standard of review and to the more likely than not
burden of proof.”); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D.
Or. 1996) (“In epidemiological terms, Oregon’s standard of proof means that
plaintiffs must be able to show a relative risk of greater than 2.0.”); DeLuca v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he relative risk
of limb reduction defects arising from the epidemiological data Done relies upon
will, at a minimum, have to exceed ‘2.’”).
108. See Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 08C-07-106 FSS,
2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 209, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2012) (“[S]cientists
may not be able to determine exactly what caused the plaintiff’s injury. But,
scientifically reliable epidemiological studies may provide evidence of causation
if they establish that exposure to the toxin more than doubles the risk of injury
in the general population.”).
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. AND EMOT. HARM
§ 28(a) cmt. (c)(4) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“[W]hen there is group-based evidence
finding that exposure to an agent causes an incidence of disease in the exposed
group that is more than twice the incidence in the unexposed group, the
evidence is sufficient to . . . permit submission of specific causation to a jury.”).
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Texas courts, for example, require a doubling of the risk for
epidemiological data to satisfy either general or specific
causation. 110 Additionally, Texas courts require that studies
demonstrate this risk as statistically significant at a 95%
confidence level, another statistical parameter for measuring
scientific rigor. 111 In one Texas products liability case, plaintiffs
sued for a wrongful death, alleging that it was caused by a
prescription anti-inflammatory drug. 112 The court barred recovery
because the plaintiffs failed to present epidemiological studies
that met the Texas standard for “scientific reliability,” namely, a
relative risk over two and statistical significance at a 95%
confidence level. 113 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ offered
studies after a lengthy discussion of their scientific rigor,
concluding that none of the studies properly represented the
decedent’s dosage and duration of the drug. 114 The court went on
to reject the plaintiff’s argument that “the totality of the
evidence” could be used to prove general causation even where
individual scientific studies failed to meet Texas’s rigorous
standard. 115
Depending on the evidence and facts of a specific case, this
doubling of the risk standard may be an inappropriate barrier to
proving a plaintiff’s case: “[T]here are a number of reasons why
reliance on a relative risk of 2.0 as a bright-line boundary would
not be in accordance with sound scientific methodology in some
cases. Careful exploration and explication of what is reliable
110. See Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Tex. 2011) (“[W]hen
parties attempt to prove general causation using epidemiological evidence, a
threshold requirement of reliability is that the evidence demonstrate a
statistically significant doubling of the risk.”).
111. See id. (“We concluded that any study that did not find a doubling of
the risk that was statistically significant at the 95% confidence level was
unreliable.”).
112. See id. at 259 (“Respondents contend that Vioxx, a prescription drug,
caused their decedent’s death.”).
113. See id. at 267–68 (discussing the plaintiff’s failure to present adequate
scientific evidence supporting general causation).
114. See id. at 266–68 (summarizing the studies and emphasizing the
“differences in dose and duration compared to [the decedent’s] exposure”).
115. See id. at 268 (“The totality of the evidence cannot prove general
causation if it does not meet the standards for scientific reliability established
by Havner. A plaintiff cannot prove causation by presenting different types of
unreliable evidence.”).
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scientific methodology in a given context is necessary.” 116 A
certain relative risk cutoff may also be misleading when a
plaintiff has a genetic or epigenetic susceptibility to a particular
substance. 117 If a plaintiff has a genetic or epigenetic marker
revealing susceptibility to a substance, then a study’s relative
risk may underestimate the risk that the individual plaintiff
faces from exposure. On the other hand, if a plaintiff lacks a
common genetic or epigenetic marker contributing to a disease,
then a study’s relative risk may underestimate the contribution
that exposure had to that particular disease. 118 Because of these
types of ambiguities, some courts take a more holistic approach to
determining evidentiary sufficiency. 119 New Jersey courts, for
example, will not exclude an expert’s testimony merely because
she relies on studies with a relative risk below 2.0. 120 The New
Jersey Superior Court emphasized the importance of leaving the
evidentiary weight issues to the fact-finder. 121 Following this
precedent, the New Jersey Supreme Court further elaborated:
“[A] relative risk of 2.0 is not so much a password to a finding of
causation as one piece of evidence, among others, for the court to
consider in determining whether the expert has employed a
sound methodology in reaching his or her conclusion.” 122 Other
courts have similarly given the jury more discretion in
determining causation, finding a specific cutoff to be entirely
arbitrary. 123
116. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 719 (Tex. 1997).
117. See Green, supra note 88, at 616–17 (noting the possible impact of
genetic contributions to a plaintiff’s risk).
118. See id. (“[G]enetics might be known to be responsible for 50% of the
incidence of a disease independent of exposure to the agent. If genetics can be
ruled out in an individual’s case, then a relative risk greater than 1.5 might be
sufficient . . . .”).
119. See id. at 616 (discussing how some courts handle additional factors
that may affect the causation inquiry).
120. See Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671, 676–77 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1991) (“In the case before us we need not, for the reasons stated
earlier, set any risk factor limitation at 2.0 or any other arbitrary number. The
total basis for the expert’s opinion must be scrutinized.”).
121. See id. at 676 (noting the importance of “the resolution of the issue by a
jury”).
122. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1087 (N.J. 1992).
123. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. U.S. Mineral Prods.
Co., 52 F.3d 1124, 1134 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We believe that it would be far
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2. Dose-Response Curves

Toxic tort cases also rely heavily on expert evidence
regarding the dose-response curve, which shows the relationship
between relative risk and exposure. 124 These curves demonstrate
how “a change in amount, intensity, or duration of exposure to an
agent is associated with a change—either an increase or
decrease—in risk of disease.” 125 If a plaintiff can prove exposure
to a certain level of a substance, and a well-known dose-response
curve exists, then this provides strong evidence for causation. 126
The figure below provides a sample dose-response curve, showing
two different types of relationships between exposure and
disease. 127 The straight line represents how the risk of disease
increases steadily with each additional dose (exposure) of a
particular agent. 128 The curved line shows the relationship for an
agent with some threshold level of exposure. 129 People can be
exposed to some dose without any risk, but once the dose meets a
threshold, the risk increases sharply with additional exposure. 130
At some point, the dose becomes so high that a maximum level of
risk has been reached, and the curve levels off again because
preferable for the district court to instruct the jury on statistical significance
and then let the jury decide whether many studies over the 1.0 mark have any
significance in combination.”); Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 418 (D.
Utah 1984) (“The value of the available statistical data concerning radiation and
cancer in off-site communities is not confined by arbitrary tests of ‘statistical
significance.’ Nor is the court constrained by simplistic models of causal
probability impressed upon the judicial ‘preponderance of the evidence’
standard.”), rev’d on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987).
124. See McClain v. Metabolite Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir.
2005) (“When analyzing an expert’s methodology in toxic tort cases, the court
should pay careful attention to the expert’s testimony about
the dose-response relationship.”).
125. Green et al., supra note 105, at 622.
126. See, e.g., Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 848–49
(W.D. Tex. 2005) (discussing the usefulness of dose-response curves in proving
causation and considering the plaintiffs’ offered dose-response evidence).
127. Figure reprinted from Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin,
Reference Guide on Toxicology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 633, 643 (3d ed. 2011).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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there is little more that additional exposure can cause. 131 For
some substances, the dose response curves become very complex,
and courts struggle with how to weigh expert opinions on
dose-response relationships. 132
Figure 2: Sample Dose-Response Curve

Although these curves are useful for quantifying disease risk,
they can vary for each individual, depending on genetic,
epigenetic, and environmental factors—and a combination of all
three. 133 As with relative risk data, courts should consider
dose-response curves in concert with all available evidence rather
131. Id.
132. See id. at 642 n.28 (discussing some of the controversy in evaluating
dose-response curves for cancer causation); see, e.g., Cano v. Everest Minerals
Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 849 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (summarizing case law
regarding the particular dose-response relationship offered by the plaintiffs’
expert).
133. See Jirtle et al., supra note 36, at 261 (“These epigenetic biomarkers
will hopefully allow for the early diagnosis of individuals with a propensity for
adult-onset disease. . . . Such an approach to human disease management could
revolutionize medical care, which now mainly treats diseases only after they
develop.”).
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than as determinative of any causation issue on their own. 134
Therefore, plaintiffs should not be barred from recovering solely
because they have not proven that their dose of exposure is linked
to a threshold risk of disease. 135
IV. Alternative Models of Causation in Toxic Torts
A. Merging General and Specific Causation
One solution to the difficulty of proving specific causation is
to allow general causation evidence to satisfy the specific
causation inquiry as well. 136 This approach is “based on a policy
determination that when the incidence of a disease or injury is
sufficiently elevated due to exposure to a substance, someone who
was exposed to that substance and exhibits the disease or injury
can raise a fact question on causation.” 137 General causation
must, at a minimum, be supported by strong and consistent
epidemiological data. 138 Courts can then presume specific
causation from the statistical probabilities yielded by scientific
data. 139
Even with this approach, courts decide a standard for
scientific rigor before epidemiological studies can be used to prove
the plaintiff’s case. 140 This determination shapes not only the
134. See Gerald W. Boston, A Mass Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The
Content of Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 181, 240 (1993) (addressing the difficulties with determining an exact doseresponse relationship for a particular environmental agent).
135. Id.
136. See Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 374
(Vt. 2010) (“Notwithstanding this limitation, numerous courts have considered
the role that epidemiological studies can play in establishing specific
causation.”).
137. Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 715 (Tex. 1997).
138. See, e.g., id. at 715 (“Recognizing that epidemiological studies cannot
establish the actual cause of an individual’s injury or condition, a difficult
question for the courts is how a plaintiff faced with this conundrum can raise a
fact issue on causation and meet the ‘more likely than not’ burden of proof.”).
139. See Rosenberg, supra note 83, at 858 (noting that this approach
“converts the balance of probabilities into a conclusive presumption that the
causal connection did or did not exist between the parties in the particular
case”).
140. See Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 08C-07-106 FSS,
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weight of scientific evidence but also whether or not certain
experts and studies are even admissible. 141 For example, in
Estate of George v. Vermont League of Cities & Towns, 142 the
plaintiff offered eight epidemiological studies in order to support
a workers’ compensation claim that the claimant’s years of
firefighting caused his death from lymphoma. 143 The Vermont
Supreme Court first recognized that epidemiological evidence can
play a role in specific causation. 144 The court went on to discuss
relative risk, concluding that the trial court’s cutoff of 2.0 was
proper. 145 Ultimately, the court upheld the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment to the defendant, partly because the plaintiff
failed to offer epidemiological evidence that met the relative risk
cutoff. 146 Legal standards for scientific evidence drastically affect
a plaintiff’s ability to satisfy the causation element of a toxic tort
claim—regardless of a court’s view of general versus specific
causation. 147

2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 209, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2012) (discussing
what constitutes scientifically reliable epidemiological studies for evidence of
causation).
141. See, e.g., Andrew S. Lipton, Proving Toxic Harm: Getting Past Slice and
Dice Tactics, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 707, 710–16 (2014) (discussing evidence
issues associated with scientific studies and expert testimony).
142. 993 A.2d 367 (Vt. 2010).
143. See id. at 369 (“In 2003, claimant died of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma
(NHL). His estate brought a workers’ compensation action, alleging that his
work as a firefighter caused him to develop NHL.”); id. at 375 (noting that the
experts offered eight epidemiological studies).
144. See id. at 374 (“[N]umerous courts have considered the role that
epidemiological studies can play in establishing specific causation.”).
145. See id. at 378 (“[W]e conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in considering a relative risk greater than 2.0 as a reasonable and
helpful benchmark under the circumstances presented here.”).
146. See id. at 375 (“The trial court found that only two of the eight
epidemiological studies relied upon by the experts in this case reflected a
relative risk greater than 2.0 . . . .”); id. at 382 (concluding that summary
judgment in favor of the defendant was proper).
147. See id. at 707 (noting the difficulty of proving causation with opposing
experts and epidemiological studies).

1044

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019 (2016)
B. Substantial Factor

Courts will also invoke the “substantial factor” test as an
alternative to but-for causation. 148 Under this approach, legal
cause is satisfied if “(a) [an actor’s] conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law
relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which
his negligence has resulted in the harm.” 149 New Jersey courts
follow this standard for toxic tort cases, noting that “[t]here is no
requirement in the law that a single cause be found and
proven. All that is required is that the plaintiff show that a
defendant’s conduct or defective product was a proximate cause of
the condition, i.e., a substantial factor in bringing the condition
about.” 150
In Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 151 the California
Supreme Court invoked the substantial factor test for proving
causation in a suit for asbestos-related injuries and wrongful
death. 152 Instead of requiring the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant’s exact fibers caused the onset of cancer, the court
allowed the plaintiff to prove that “exposure to defendant’s
product was a substantial factor causing the illness.” 153 The court
elaborated that the plaintiff could satisfy this proof “by showing
that in reasonable medical probability it was a substantial factor
contributing to the plaintiff’s or decedent’s risk of developing
cancer.” 154
However, the court reversed a lower court’s decision to give a
burden-shifting instruction on causation to the jury. 155 Lower
courts in California allow for such a burden shift if “the plaintiff
has proved that a particular asbestos supplier’s product was
‘defective,’ that the plaintiff’s injuries or death were legally
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1967).
149. Id.
150. Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671, 677 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991).
151. 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).
152. See id. at 1206 (summarizing the procedural and factual history of the
case).
153. Id. at 1223.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1217–18.
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caused by asbestos exposure generally, and that he was exposed
to asbestos fibers from the defendant’s product.” 156 The defendant
then bears the burden of proving that its product did not cause
the harm. 157 California’s Supreme Court noted that such a
burden shift is unnecessary when the fact-finders understand the
limits of proving causation in such cases, noting that the
substantial factor instruction was sufficient to accomplish this
task. 158
C. Sufficient-to-Have-Caused
A related, yet slightly different, test for causation is the
“sufficient-to-have-caused” standard, which requires exposure to
be of a level able to cause the harm, even if there is limited
evidence connecting exposure to a particularized harm. 159
Although the Second Restatement of Torts used “substantial
factor” language, the Third Restatement of Torts rejected that
doctrine in favor of the sufficient-to-have-caused standard. 160 The
Third Restatement, as well as several courts, has adopted this
doctrine instead of the substantial factor test because of the
likelihood for confusion over what constitutes a substantial
factor. 161 For example, Virginia follows the sufficient-to156. Id. at 1208.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 1217–18 (“[T]he most fundamental reason why a
burden-shifting instruction is unnecessary to proving an asbestos-related cancer
latent injury case becomes clear when the limits on the plaintiff’s burden of
proof on causation are properly understood.”).
159. See Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer, 736 S.E.2d 724, 732 (Va. 2013) (“The
exposure must have been ‘a’ sufficient cause . . . . Excluding other exposures
from the pool of multiple sufficient causes will require competent medical
testimony indicating whether the timing of exposure could possibly have caused
the [disease].”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 27 (2010) (“[C]ourts have long
imposed liability when a tortfeasor’s conduct, while not necessary for the
outcome, would have been a factual cause if the other competing cause had not
been operating.”).
160. See Boomer, 736 S.E.2d at 730–31 (discussing the Restatement’s
approach to multiple contributing causes and ultimately using the sufficient-tohave-caused standard).
161. See id. at 730 (“[S]ubstantial contributing factor could be construed to
mean any cause that is more than a merely de minimis factor. Conversely, the
invocation of the term ‘substantial’ could be interpreted to raise the standard for
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have-caused standard for mesothelioma cases where there may
be multiple causes. 162
D. Increased Risk
A minority of states allow plaintiffs a cause of action based
on an increased risk of future disease, such as that resulting from
an exposure to a carcinogen. 163 Because courts do not want to
impose liability for harms that are merely speculative, these
claims typically must prove some accompanying immediate harm,
such as present physical injury, emotional distress, or medical
monitoring. 164 Most courts also require that the harm is likely to
occur based on a preponderance of the evidence and expert
testimony. 165
One common approach to allowing increased risk claims is
for courts to require an accompanying present physical injury to
proof of causation beyond a mere preponderance of the evidence to some more
elevated standard.”).
162. See id. at 732 (“We find that in concurring causation cases, the
‘sufficient’-to-have-caused standard as elaborated above is the proper way to
define the cause-in-fact element of proximate cause.”).
163. See, e.g., Lester v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 120 So. 3d 767, 781 (La. Ct. App.
2013) (“[T]he Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged a cause of action for
damages for increased risk of contracting cancer as a valid claim . . . .”); Gideon
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985) (“His claim
includes, without limitation, all damages for future pain and suffering, inability
to work in the future, reduced life expectancy, future medical expenses, and
future disabilities and diseases that will probably develop from present
injuries.”).
164. See Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985)
(“If mere exposure to asbestos were sufficient to give rise to a F.E.L.A. cause of
action, countless seemingly healthy railroad workers, workers who might never
manifest injury, would have tort claims cognizable in federal court.”); Merry v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847, 848 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that
the plaintiffs are not seeking a claim for increased risk of future illness but for
emotional distress and medical monitoring).
165. See Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137–38 (“Whether the district court should
have excluded evidence that Gideon may develop cancer turns on
epistemology. . . . Certainty, however, is not required: the plaintiff need
demonstrate only that the event is more likely to occur than not.”); Cudone v.
Gehret, 821 F. Supp. 266, 270–71 (D. Del. 1993) (permitting a cognizable
increased risk claim when experts showed that “it is more probable than not”
that the plaintiff would experience a recurrence of cancer in her lifetime).
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allow recovery. 166 In some courts, genetic mutation and
chromosomal damage satisfy this standard, providing one
possible analogy to how courts might deal with epigenetic
changes. 167 In Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 168 the plaintiffs
lived near a uranium milling facility in South Dakota and sued
for increased risk of cancer and other diseases as a result of
radiation exposure. 169 The United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, asserting diversity jurisdiction, considered
increased risk claims to be cognizable only with present physical
injury. 170 The court denied the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment based on expert testimony that concluded “with a
reasonable degree of medical probability both that there has been
chromosomal damage and that such damage was caused by the
radiation.” 171 The court noted the importance of plaintiffs’
“experts of national renown,” who agreed that subcellular damage
166. See, e.g., Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D. Colo.
1984) (“[I]n order to recover future damages for enhanced cancer risk, plaintiffs
must have suffered a definite, present physical injury.”); Capital Holding Corp.
v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 194 (Ky. 1994) (“It is tangible injury that triggers the
existence of a cause of action, and then, once a harmful change has occurred the
plaintiff may sue for the increased risk of future consequences which are
presently compensable as a part of the cause of action that has accrued.”).
167. See Brafford, 586 F. Supp. at 17–18 (denying summary judgment for
the defendant because the plaintiffs were exposed to high levels of radiation,
which experts testified “with a reasonable degree of medical probability” caused
chromosomal damage, satisfying the present physical injury requirement); see
also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 303,
315 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Further, assuming that the model of carcinogenesis Dr.
Mehlman describes is valid, as I must for the purposes of summary judgment,
the physical manifestation of MTBE in plaintiffs’ bodies is not benign, but can
be the first step in the development of the disease they claim to fear.”);
Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1227 (D. Mass. 1986) (“[T]he
court did not distinguish between gross and subcellular harm. Instead, the court
drew a line between harm which can be proven to exist through expert medical
testimony based on objective evidence and harm which is merely speculative or
based solely on a plaintiff's unsupported assertions.”).
168. 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984).
169. See id. at 15 (noting the plaintiff’s possible tort claim based on
increased risk of disease as a result of exposure to radiation).
170. See id. at 17 (discussing precedent in the jurisdiction for increased risk
claims).
171. See id. at 17–18 (noting that such subcellular injury was sufficient to
state a claim and survive a summary judgment motion from the defendant
based on no present physical injury).
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from radiation should be considered an injury. 172 The present
cellular damage operated to “cock the trigger” of cancer in the
future, thus “depriv[ing] plaintiffs of a degree of immunity which
they had enjoyed prior to their exposure.” 173
Similarly, in Werlein v. United States, 174 the plaintiffs lived
near a site contaminated by trichloroethylene 175 and were
exposed to a contaminated water supply. 176 Minnesota requires a
present physical injury for a cognizable increased risk claim. 177
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on
the adequacy of subcellular injury for fulfilling the present
physical injury requirement:
Plaintiffs’ experts have testified that plaintiffs who have been
exposed to contaminated air and drinking water have suffered
an actual physical injury in the form of chromosomal
breakage, and damage to the cardiovascular and immunal
systems. . . . These experts also have testified that the present
injuries are the cause of the alleged increased future risk of
disease. . . . Based on the record before it, this Court cannot
rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are not
“real” simply because they are subcellular. The effect of
volatile organic compounds on the human body is a subtle,
complex matter. It is for the trier of fact, aided by expert
testimony, to determine whether plaintiffs have suffered
present harm. 178

Other courts, however, view subcellular injury as too
speculative to sustain a claim for increased risk. In Rainer v.
Union Carbide Corp., 179 workers from a uranium-enrichment
172. Id. at 18.
173. Id.
174. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990).
175. Trichloroethylene is an industrial solvent known to cause cancer,
primarily causing damage to the human nervous system, liver, and kidneys. See
Trichloroethylene,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY
(Apr.
1992),
http://www.epa.gov/airtoxics/hlthef/tri-ethy.html (last updated Jan. 2000) (last
visited Mar. 5, 2016) (summarizing the health risks of trichloroethylene) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
176. Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 890.
177. See id. at 901 (discussing precedent in the jurisdiction allowing
increased risk claims).
178. Id.
179. 402 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2005).
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plant in Kentucky sued for exposure even though none had
symptoms of clinical disease. 180 The court explicitly rejected the
subcellular-damage precedents of Brafford and Werlein, noting
that “the issue of whether chromosome damage constitutes a
‘present physical injury’ is essentially a legal question, not a
factual one.” 181 The court cited three public policy reasons for its
decision. 182 First, the court wanted to avoid opening the door to
endless litigation. 183 Second, the court noted that allowing this
claim would bar future claims for injury given Kentucky’s “one
claim” rule for tort plaintiffs. 184 Last, the court discussed the
difficulty of calculating damages where “the injuries claimed to
date have caused no financial losses or impairments.” 185
Advances in scientific research may, however, persuade more
courts to follow the logic of Werlein and Brafford rather than the
logic of Rainer.
E. Other Alternatives
Legal scholar Steve Gold argues that none of the existing
causation frameworks fits the science of molecular epidemiology,
and courts should instead adopt an entirely “probabilistic causal
contribution model.” 186 This approach would consider any
exposure as a cause if it contributed to a disease. 187 Such a
determination would require a plaintiff to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the exposure added to the
plaintiff’s incremental risk of a disease from which the plaintiff

180. Id. at 611.
181. Id. at 621.
182. Id.
183. See id. (discussing the high number of possible plaintiffs, given
everyday exposure to possible toxins).
184. See id. (noting that plaintiffs may have a better chance of recovery if
they wait until disease symptoms manifest).
185. See id. at 622 (noting that the only logical damages for subcellular
injury are those for medical monitoring because no other harms have yet
occurred).
186. Gold, supra note 14, at 338–39.
187. See id. at 281–82 (discussing the probabilistic causal contribution
standard).
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suffers. 188 Damages, then, would vary according to the proportion
of risk created by the exposure. 189 Gold adapts an illustration
from the Third Restatement of Torts for why his framework fits
scientific evidence better than the existing doctrines. 190 His
example involves three defendants—Able, Baker, and Charlie—
who collectively push a car off a mountain. 191 He elaborates on
how the fact pattern would change if it incorporated the
uncertainties of subcellular harm and disease onset:
Suppose, however, that Able, Baker, and Charlie could
not be described by Newtonian physics but only by quantum
mechanics. On a mountaintop ringed with cars, the three
charge around blindfolded. What is more, they are joined by
undetectable sprites that also impart momentum to any object
they strike. Sometimes Able, Baker, and Charlie hit a car, and
sometimes the impact is powerful enough to tip the car down
the hill. But this is a quantum world: if we know what they
hit, we cannot tell how hard they hit it. And we can’t detect
the sprite strikes at all. Every once in a while a car rolls down
the hill. But the most science can tell us—if we can say
whether Able, Baker, Charlie, or any combination of the three
hit the car at some point before its descent—is the probability
that they hit the car hard enough to make it move.
If Able, Baker, and Charlie represent independent risk
factors for a disease, and the invisible sprites represent
unknown causes, then the probabilistic metaphor fits a wide
range of toxic tort cases. 192

Gold’s approach would allow courts to determine causation
according to scientific probabilities related to exposure and
disease onset. 193
188. See id. (noting that the plaintiff’s case “would be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence . . . to have added incremental risk that the
plaintiff would develop a disease that the plaintiff in fact developed”).
189. See id. (“Damages should be apportioned to that contributing factor in
proportion to its contribution to the plaintiff's risk.”).
190. Id. at 283.
191. See id. (describing how the illustration would work using Newtonian
physics—a certain amount of force pushes the car over the mountain, and each
defendant contributes a portion of that force).
192. Id. at 283.
193. See id. at 303–04 (“Because such measures will continue to be the type
of evidence that science can provide, it is time for a corresponding probabilistic
contributing-factor model of causation.”).
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Yet another option is to take the legal analysis entirely out of
the problem and present scientific issues to a “science panel” that
would then decide scientific issues on behalf of the court. 194
Ontario, for example, uses an Industrial Disease Standards Panel
for workers’ compensation claims. 195 The Panel’s role is to
“investigate potential industrial diseases, make findings about
the causal connection between disease and exposure, specify
criteria for evaluation of claims, and advise compensation boards
about eligibility rules.” 196 In the United States, a few judges have
appointed science panels when expert testimony on causation
conflicted. 197 Like the probabilistic causal model, a science panel
would be able to weigh scientific evidence regarding statistics and
probabilities and come to a conclusion on causation. 198
V. Adapting Causation Doctrine to Epigenetic Evidence
Scientific research is progressing quickly, and there are
many epidemiological studies linking environmental conditions,
epigenetic markers, and various diseases. 199 Legal scholarship
addressing epigenetic harms focuses on broad impacts to tort
liability and regulatory governance, particularly in the field of
194. See Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some
Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific
Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 10 (1989) (“The science
panel . . . is a panel of scientists, possibly aided by lawyers and concerned
citizens, who adjudicate a specific question regarding a technical dispute and
formulate a consensus opinion. . . . [T]he science panel would provide a
consensus opinion on a given causal dispute for the court.”).
195. See id. at 16 (discussing ways in which scientists have played a role in
the legal causation framework).
196. Id.
197. See Laural L. Hooper et al., Assessing Causation in Breast Implant
Litigation: The Role of Science Panels, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 140–41
(2001) (“[F]ederal judges appointed panels of scientific experts to help assess
conflicting scientific testimony regarding causation of systemic injuries by
silicone gel breast implants.”).
198. See Brennan, supra note 194, at 19 (“[J]udges and most people are used
to thinking about causation in terms of mechanistic causal chains. Scientists,
however, rely to a large extent, especially in the science of toxicology, on
probabilistic evidence of causation and statistical proof of propositions.”).
199. See supra Part II (discussing the state of epigenetic science and its
relevance for toxic tort cases).
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transgenerational harms. 200 For example, legal scholar
Christopher
Weiner
focuses
on
precedent
allowing
transgenerational liability for harm, particularly when dealing
with a preconception tort. 201 University of Georgia Professor of
Law Fazal Khan analyzes the potential regulatory issues that
need to be addressed as science develops in this field. 202 Other
scholars examine the public health and social justice impacts of
transgenerational epigenetic harms—particularly those resulting
from poor nutrition and stressful environments. 203 Although this
scholarship provides an important overview of general legal
issues associated with epigenetics, an in-depth analysis of each
individual issue is necessary for preparing the legal system to
deal with new scientific evidence.
Thus, this Note addresses how courts should handle
epidemiological evidence of epigenetic harms in toxic tort cases.
This Note argues that (1) rather than using a bright-line
scientific cutoff for admissibility or sufficiency of evidence, courts
should defer to the fact-finder for evaluating scientific evidence,
and the fact-finder should weigh epidemiological evidence in the
context of the other evidence available in a case; (2) epigenetic
harms should be considered present physical injury sufficient to
support a claim for increased risk of disease, following the model
of the subcellular injury cases; 204 and (3) within such a claim, the
200. See generally Christopher J. Weiner, Transgenerational Tort Liability
for Epigenetic Disease, 13 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 319 (2011) (proposing a
framework for transgenerational tort liability for epigenetic harms); Khan,
supra note 81 (analyzing how tort cases and regulations can be used to manage
epigenetic harms and promote fairness and justice); Mark A. Rothstein,
Epigenetic Exceptionalism: Currents in Contemporary Bioethics, 41 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 733 (2013) (discussing whether epigenetics should be regulated as its
own field or whether existing regulations and doctrines addressing genetics
should be modified to incorporate epigenetic science).
201. See Weiner, supra note 200, at 326–27 (discussing how preconception
tort liability could evolve with epigenetic evidence).
202. See Khan, supra note 81, at 277 (“This article proposes a dynamic
regulatory framework allowing for decisive actions against epigenetic threats
without conclusive proof of harm, but requiring continual adaptation as new
learning becomes available.”).
203. See Geronimus, supra note 75, at S56 (“Ultimately, such findings offer
new hope of identifying means to short circuit the processes—both social and
biological—whereby membership in a racialized, gendered, and economically
stratified society may lead to health inequalities.”).
204. See supra Part IV.D.1 (discussing how courts have handled genetic and
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general and specific causation inquiries should be merged when
appropriate.
A. Evidentiary Issues
Although bright-line rules for admissibility and sufficiency of
evidence simplify the judicial task, they can also unfairly and
unreasonably bar recovery. 205 Scientific research and evidence
simply do not follow the confines of legal causation doctrine. 206
The biological onset of disease after exposure is rarely, if ever,
certain. 207 Even with a full understanding of the epigenetic
mechanisms leading to certain diseases, proving the specific
causal sequence for an individual plaintiff will remain difficult. 208
Most scientific research on epigenetic harms will be in the form of
epidemiological studies and population-level data, yielding
parameters such as relative risk and dose-response curves. 209
Many courts deal with these evidentiary uncertainties by
unnecessarily excluding or scrutinizing scientific data, requiring
each individual study to meet arbitrary cutoffs before it can be
admitted or considered sufficient for a plaintiff’s case. 210 This
chromosomal damage in increased risk cases).
205. See supra notes 116–123 and accompanying text (discussing courts that
have chosen to avoid bright-line rules for expert testimony and epidemiological
evidence).
206. See Gold, supra note 14, at 276 (“But the law must understand how
science can best contribute. That understanding begins with acceptance of the
fact that bringing toxicological understanding to the molecular level will not
bring causation to the individual level.”).
207. See id. at 280 (“At a molecular level, many of the processes associated
with toxicity and disease are simply random.”).
208. See id. at 276 (“Thus, finding that a plaintiff does or does not have
a . . . susceptibility to the disease-causing effect of a substance to which the
plaintiff was exposed will provide probabilistic but not deterministic evidence of
causation or its absence.”).
209. See id. (“The data will still be about relative risk, but risk will be
parsed more and more finely. . . . [N]ew associations will be detected or known
associations will be disaggregated in new ways. This process has already begun
even for causal connections that were already relatively well-accepted.”).
210. See Lipton, supra note 141, at 709 (“[C]ourts have aggressively
exercised their gatekeeper roles to reject expert causation testimony . . . by
taking an atomistic approach that examines individually and independently
each piece of scientific evidence . . . .”).
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method is known as the “corpuscular approach” because it breaks
down a holistic case into small, easily attacked segments. 211 This
approach, however, ignores the evidentiary strength of
aggregating multiple scientific studies with the specific facts of a
plaintiff’s case. 212 By attacking the scientific rigor of each
individual study, a defendant can unfairly bias the court against
a plaintiff’s case. 213
To avoid this unfair bias, courts should liberally admit
epidemiological evidence regarding the links between epigenetic
harms and disease. Furthermore, courts should allow the
fact-finder significant discretion in weighing the totality of
scientific evidence. 214 Ultimately, causation is a subjective legal
inquiry, although scientific and legal guidelines can direct the
analysis. 215 Scientific inquiries simply do not follow the linear,
but-for causation demanded by the legal system. 216 The causation
inquiry, then, should be left to the fact-finder rather than
requiring an arbitrary threshold as a matter of law. 217

211. Id.
212. See id. at 710 (“[T]he well-recognized weight-of-the-evidence
methodology . . . permits scientific opinions based upon conclusions drawn from
the totality of the evidence, with no individual study or piece of data having to
be sufficient on its own to prove causation.”).
213. See Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and
Causation to Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. REV. 1, 19 (2001) (noting that epidemiological studies almost
always have flaws and uncertainties that can be used to defeat a plaintiff’s
case).
214. See supra notes 116–123 and accompanying text (discussing courts that
have decided to allow the jury discretion in evaluating scientific evidence rather
than deciding the weight based on arbitrary scientific parameters).
215. See, e.g., King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24, 39
(Neb. 2009) (“But determining causation differs from the objective inquiry into
relative risk. An assessment of a causal relationship is not a scientific
methodology as that term is used to describe logic (like a syllogism) and analytic
methods. Instead, it involves subjective judgment.”).
216. See supra notes 205–209 and accompanying text (discussing the
fundamental disconnect between scientific evidence and legal doctrines of
causation).
217. See, e.g., King, 762 N.W.2d at 46–47 (declining to set a minimum
threshold for relative risk or other statistical measurements and noting that
“the significance of epidemiological studies with weak positive associations is a
question of weight, not admissibility”).
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B. Increased Risk Framework
Epigenetic evidence may address many of the law’s concerns
with increased risk claims in toxic tort cases, allowing these
claims to proceed with more success. 218 One criticism of the
increased risk approach is that it still operates within but-for
causation: each exposure is a but-for cause of an increase in
risk. 219 As scientific research progresses, links between exposure,
increased risk, and disease onset will become more readily
available for proving a plaintiff’s case. 220 Epidemiological data
should fill in many of the causal gaps between exposure and
disease. 221 Applying but-for causation to the increased risk
framework might become possible as certain epigenetic markers
are connected to certain levels of exposure and disease. 222 This
type of evidence, however, will only support general causation,
meaning that courts will still need to grapple with how to analyze
specific causation. 223
Another criticism is that tort law cannot and should not
compensate every individual exposed to a risk. 224 Otherwise,
218. See supra Part III.C (discussing the increased risk framework and the
primary reasons why courts are reluctant to allow such claims).
219. See Gold, supra note 14, at 298–99 (“With respect to causation doctrine,
however, it implicitly retreated to the comfortable confines of but-for: each
material exposure to asbestos, tautologically, was a but-for cause of the
increment of risk associated with that exposure.”).
220. See Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Colo. 1984)
(describing the link between subcellular damage and disease onset as having
the “trigger cocked” on cancer and as depriving the plaintiff of a level of
immunity against disease); see also supra Part II (discussing the link between
epigenetic markers and disease onset).
221. See supra Part II (discussing the state of epidemiologic data and how
epigenetic studies are likely to reveal many more disease mechanisms than
previously known).
222. See supra Parts II, III.C (discussing the progress of epigenetic science
and the demands of the increased risk framework).
223. See Gold, supra note 14, at 278–79 (“[T]he enormous number of possible
combinations of potentially interacting causal factors—genes, epigenetics, other
individual characteristics, and exposures—makes it extraordinarily unlikely
that complete risk characterization will ever be possible at an individual level.”).
224. See id. at 299–300 (“The latter would invite the objection that many
negligent or otherwise wrongful acts create risk of harm, but tort law ordinarily
does not, and practicably could not, compensate every person exposed to such
risks.”).
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individuals would receive compensation based on harms that may
never materialize, creating unnecessary and unending liability
for defendants. 225 Epigenetic changes, however, provide evidence
of exposure (and harm) before disease symptoms occur and can
even provide evidence of ancestral exposure to toxins. 226 Courts
can therefore treat the epigenetic change either as harm itself (as
in the genetic and subcellular damage cases) or as distinct
evidence of risk exposure itself. 227 Either approach would limit
the liability for increased risk because not every exposed
individual would show the epigenetic abnormalities necessary for
disease onset. 228 Courts could limit recovery by requiring
plaintiffs to prove epigenetic abnormalities associated with both
exposure and disease. Similarly, only defendants who created
risks sufficient for epigenetic harm would be held liable—this
standard would address the concerns over limitless liability for
negligence without resulting harm. Therefore, this approach
would limit liability while still compensating those harmed and
serving the additional deterrent purpose of the tort system. 229
C. Addressing General and Specific Causation
225. See Stites v. Sunstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1526
(W.D. Mich. 1987) (“Accepting plaintiffs’ risk of cancer claim in this instance
may allow plaintiffs to recover, from a jury, monetary relief for an injury they
are not reasonably certain to suffer.”); Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788
F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e conclude that a plaintiff can recover only
where he can show that the toxic exposure more probably than not will lead to
cancer.”).
226. See Manikkam, supra note 65, at 5 (“[D]istinct epigenetic changes in
differential DNA methylation regions (DMR) provide epigenetic biomarkers for
ancestral environmental exposures. Each exposure had a distinct epigenetic
signature that can be used as a biomarker. . . . [T]he current study provides the
proof of concept that epigenetic biomarkers for environmental exposures exist.”).
227. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing case precedent allowing subcellular
injury to fulfill the present physical injury requirement in increased risk cases);
see also Erik S. Knutsen, Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A
Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 249, 275 (“An increased risk
would be treated as a new compensable injury for which a defendant would be
liable. Exposure to risk of harm would be considered a harm itself.”).
228. See supra Part II (discussing how epigenetic change varies across
individuals, even when exposed to the same environmental conditions).
229. See McGarity, supra note 213, at 35–38 (summarizing how the current
toxic tort evidentiary standards inhibit the deterrence goals of the tort system).
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Most uncertainty associated with causation in toxic tort cases
falls into one of four categories: (1) trans-scientific uncertainty,
when scientific relationships are inferred from existing studies
but not yet proven by epidemiological data; (2) statistical
uncertainty, when scientific evidence is ambiguous due to sample
sizes and other experimental set-up issues; (3) individual
attribution uncertainty, which deals with the issues surrounding
specific causation; and (4) vocabulary or multiple causation
uncertainty, when the scientific jargon and methodology create
confusion for the court in applying legal doctrines to evidence. 230
Of these, individual attribution uncertainty and statistical
uncertainty are typically key considerations for epidemiological
evidence. 231
When these uncertainties combine with the errors and biases
inherent in scientific research, proving causation becomes
extremely difficult for a toxic tort plaintiff. 232 Because of these
challenges, courts should accept consistent, peer-reviewed
epidemiological evidence as specific causation, leaving the weight
of the evidence to be determined by the fact-finder. 233 In doing so,
courts would follow the precedent of the states using a “weak”
view of causation. 234 Plaintiffs should not recover solely on the
basis of epidemiological data, but a lack of specific causation
should not bar recovery when plaintiffs otherwise present a
strong case. 235 Such evidence should at least allow a plaintiff to
230. See Brennan, supra note 194, at 23–26 (summarizing how causal
uncertainty in toxic tort cases relates to the challenges of using scientific
evidence).
231. See id. (listing the circumstances under which these various issues are
at play in the legal determination of causation).
232. See supra notes 205–213 and accompanying text (addressing how
defendants can easily attack scientific evidence due to the uncertainties
inherent in the scientific process).
233. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing various
standards for treating epidemiological data as specific causation).
234. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text (comparing the “strong”
and “weak” approaches to causation).
235. See Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 418 (D. Utah 1984) (“Nor
is the court constrained by simplistic models of causal probability impressed
upon the judicial ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard.”), rev’d on other
grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner,
953 S.W.2d 706, 720–21 (Tex. 1997) (“Courts should allow a party . . . to present
the best available evidence . . . and only then should a court determine from a
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survive a summary judgment motion in a toxic tort case, allowing
the fact-finder to decide based on the full record of scientific and
legal evidence. 236
Evidence of epigenetic harm would still face the common
problems with general and specific causation. 237 As science
connects environmental factors, epigenetic change, and disease
onset, epidemiological data will develop to support general
causation. 238 Proving the specific instance of exposure that led to
the epigenetic change, however, will remain difficult. 239 As a
result, these two inquiries should be merged into one. In other
words, strong epidemiological data—ideally peer-reviewed,
consistent, and accepted by scientific experts—should satisfy
specific causation as well.
D. Difficulties and Alternative Solutions
Alternatives to developing common law doctrine on causation
include passing legislation or regulations addressing either the
evidentiary issues or the factors that are known to cause
epigenetic harms leading to disease. For example, one legal
scholar suggests amending the Federal Rules of Evidence so that
totality of the evidence, considering all factors affecting the reliability of
particular studies, whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support a
judgment.”).
236. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. U.S. Mineral Prods.
Co., 52 F.3d 1124, 1134 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We believe that it would be far
preferable for the district court to instruct the jury on statistical significance
and then let the jury decide whether many studies over the 1.0 mark have any
significance in combination.”); see also supra notes 205–217 and accompanying
text (arguing for leaving most of the evidentiary decisions to the fact-finder).
237. See Gold, supra note 14, at 278–79 (“[T]he enormous number of possible
combinations of potentially interacting causal factors—genes, epigenetics, other
individual characteristics, and exposures—makes it extraordinarily unlikely
that complete risk characterization will ever be possible at an individual level.”).
238. See id. at 278 (“Toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology are
producing evidence about suspected exposure-disease links at finer and finer
scales of resolution, but they have not altered the essential nature of that
evidence.”).
239. See id. at 279 (“For the most part, increased knowledge of toxicity at
the genomic and molecular levels will simply provide an increasingly detailed
description of probabilistic associations—population-based frequencies rather
than deterministic certainties.”).
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judges no longer act as “super-scientists” who scrutinize every
epidemiologic study. 240 Such an amendment would supersede the
current precedent of Daubert and Joiner. 241 Furthermore, if
factors causing epigenetic harm and disease were fully regulated
(for example, if products causing epigenetic harm were banned),
then courts would play a less important role in the toxic tort
system. 242
Even so, in the event that epigenetic harms were to be
highly regulated, lawsuits would still arise, and courts would still
need to address the causation and evidentiary issues. 243
Regulations and legislation both require extensive inputs of time,
political energy, money, and scientific backing. 244 With the
current rate of epigenetic research, courts will likely face these
cases before legislators are able to fully regulate the field, and
courts need to be prepared to handle both epigenetic evidence and
epigenetic harms. Ultimately, however, protection from
epigenetic harms and disease will require all three branches of
government to work in concert. 245 Even as courts address these
issues, regulations should be developed to minimize the health
risks of the factors known to lead to the worst epigenetic harms—
endocrine disruptors, for example. Indeed, California already
includes epigenetic toxicity as a hazard in its state regulations. 246
Calculating damages presents one difficulty with an
increased risk approach to epigenetic harms, particularly if
epigenetic damage is present but not causing any physical or

240. See McGarity, supra note 213, at 42 (“One possible ‘quick fix’ to
forestall the upcoming accountability crisis would be for Congress to amend the
Federal Rules of Evidence to remove (or greatly reduce) the trial judge’s
screening role.”).
241. Id.
242. See Khan, supra note 81, at 262–65 (discussing how dynamic regulation
of epigenetic health risks is preferable to handling harms through the toxic tort
system).
243. See generally id. (comparing how a comprehensive regulatory
framework for epigenetic harms would interact with the tort system).
244. See id. at 310–14 (discussing barriers to establishing a comprehensive
epigenetics regulatory framework).
245. See Khan, supra note 81, at 261–65 (discussing how to best protect
populations from epigenetic harms).
246. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 69403.4 (2012).
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emotional symptoms. 247 The same courts allowing subcellular
damage to support an increased risk claim have addressed this
very issue, considering damages associated with medical
monitoring and other harms. 248 This model should translate to
cases dealing with epigenetic harms.
VI. Conclusion
Courts already struggle with the issue of causation in toxic
tort cases. 249 As a result, courts, experts, and scholars have
argued for many different approaches to proving causation in
toxic tort cases. 250 Epigenetic research has the potential to assist
courts by providing more nuanced scientific evidence on causal
mechanisms.
Evidence of epigenetic change fits most closely within the
increased risk framework of tort liability because it provides the
intermediate causal link between environmental stressors and
disease onset. 251 By relying on such evidence, courts can limit
liability while compensating individuals with an increased risk of
disease and incentivizing behaviors that limit environmental
exposures likely to result in adverse epigenetic effects. Courts can
either follow the precedent of subcellular damage as present
physical injury or look to epigenetic evidence as proof of increased
247. See Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608, 622 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“[T]he plaintiffs have suggested no mechanisms for calculating losses resulting
from subcellular damage. Indeed, the injuries claimed to date have caused no
financial losses or impairments.”).
248. See, e.g., Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17–18 (D.
Colo. 1984) (discussing the defendant’s arguments against damages on a
summary judgment motion and acknowledging that the plaintiff should have
the opportunity to prove damages at trial).
249. See Brennan, supra note 194, at 19 (“[J]udges and most people are used
to thinking about causation in terms of mechanistic causal chains. Scientists,
however, rely to a large extent, especially in the science of toxicology, on
probabilistic evidence of causation and statistical proof of propositions.”).
250. See supra Part III (documenting the varying approaches used to
address the causation issue in toxic tort cases).
251. See Jirtle & Skinner, supra note 133, at 254 (“Environmental exposures
to nutritional, chemical and physical factors have the potential to alter gene
expression and modify adult disease susceptibility in various ways through
changes in the epigenome.”).
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risk. 252 These approaches, however, still face difficulty in proving
specific causation. Because of the unique characteristics of toxic
tort cases, the causation inquiry should be merged and left to the
jury if evidence of specific causation is lacking. 253
Epigenetics presents a number of issues for the current legal
system, and causation in toxic tort cases is but one. Some
scholars argue that epigenetic harms should be regulated rather
than litigated. 254 Moving forward, epigenetic harm will also
require courts to deal with preconception torts and
transgenerational liability. 255 Courts, therefore, must determine
how to analyze epigenetic evidence. Even if epigenetic risks
become highly regulated, courts will have to deal with related
litigation. They will also become the intermediary “regulatory”
bodies by mediating harms while the administrative and
executive branches develop regulations. Some plaintiffs are
already introducing epigenetic harm as evidence, and this process
will only accelerate as scientific development continues. 256 Most
importantly, the legal and regulatory system should be informed
about scientific developments in epigenetics and prepare
accordingly for cases and issues that are likely to arise.
In one court’s own words, “Based upon the average
American’s exposure to chemically processed foods, toxic fumes,
252. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing cases accepting
genetic and chromosomal damage as present physical injury).
253. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. U.S. Mineral Prods.
Co., 52 F.3d 1124, 1134 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We believe that it would be far
preferable for the district court to instruct the jury on statistical significance
and then let the jury decide whether many studies over the 1.0 mark have any
significance in combination.”); supra Part III.B (discussing the role of scientific
evidence in proving causation).
254. See Khan, supra note 81, at 264 (“[T]ort law appears incapable of
limiting epigenetic risk.”).
255. See Weiner, supra note 201, at 336 (“It would be unreasonable to expect
that as our understanding progresses, aggrieved children would never seek to
hold their parents liable for the risks and illnesses needlessly suffered because
of the parents’ tortious acts.”).
256. See Snyder v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 01162V, 2009 WL 332044, at *47–50 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009) (discussing the role of
epigenetics in the development of autism in a case under the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program); see also Allen v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am. Inc.
(In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 12-cv-00064, 2014 WL 46818,
at *1 (W.D. La. Jan. 6, 2014) (discussing epigenetic harm as part of the evidence
at issue).
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genetically modified fruits and vegetables, mercury-laden fish,
and hormonally treated chicken and beef, [plaintiffs] might
encompass a very large percentage of the total population.” 257
Perhaps instead of fearing “too many” plaintiffs, our legal system
should be more concerned with protecting the public from the
health risks of such exposures. By admitting and considering
epidemiological evidence of epigenetic harm, courts can address
public health while limiting liability to those harmed—even if the
harm is limited to subcellular damage. Although compensation
would not restore a plaintiff’s health, it might provide some
measure of assistance to those affected. The children in Flint,
Michigan could seek recourse through our tort system armed
with the most recent scientific research—without fearing
arbitrary legal standards that might bar their claims or their
evidence. This Note’s recommendations solve one major challenge
created by the disconnect between scientific evidence and legal
doctrine, but many more obstacles remain for both the legal and
public health fields.

257.

Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608, 621 (6th Cir. 2005).

